HA'ARETZ
Jerusalem,
14 November, 2000
The Compromise that Wasn't Found at Camp David
It isn't a case of Israeli generosity, but of
territorial division that will not enable the existence
of a Palestinian state, says Faisal Husseini.
By Amira Hass
Following the Camp David summit, officials at Orient
House decided to illustrate with maps the proposals
raised there - and the Palestinians' objections to Ehud
Barak's proposals. "The Israeli team didn't offer
maps," says Faisal Husseini, who heads the
Jerusalem negotiation team, "so we did it
ourselves: we prepared maps that will immediately show
the nature of the compromise offered to us there - the
compromise that wasn't.
The Israeli proposals, translated into maps, will be added
to other maps that depict the details of the Palestinian
proposals for a solution. The finishing touches on the
maps of the Palestinian proposals and the conceptions
behind them are now being added by the Jerusalem Task
Force, the professional team that Husseini set up in May
2000.
Husseini and his task force, which is headed by Dr.
Manuel Hasasian of Bethlehem University, initially
intended to present the booklet of maps to their Israeli
colleagues, the American ushers and the various European
observers. Husseini says this is because the
Palestinians honored the mutual commitment made at Camp
David not to go to the media. "We had no interest
in going public, we weren't looking for problems, rather
we were looking for a solution."
However, the outbreak of the Intifada and the
significant surprise among Israelis regarding the
reasons for it, prompted him to make them public, even
before the negotiations resume. In this way, the
Palestinians hope, the relevant parties will understand
why the proposals were neither a compromise nor a case
of Israeli generosity; they were a territorial division
that rules out the possibility of establishing a viable
Palestinian state.
After Camp David, Husseini says, his colleagues, who had
been in contact with Israeli negotiators, discovered
that none of them has a real mandate to negotiate.
Everything is in Barak's hands. In the meantime, the
2000 Intifada broke out before negotiations truly
resumed. World public opinion, Husseini says, "that
is stuck on the perception of far-reaching Israeli
generosity at Camp David, did not understand what the
Palestinians were so enraged about. A decision was made
to publicize the maps in order to explain the uprising,
the people's anger and their argument that they are
still subject to the rule of the occupation power and
also to serve as a basis for resuming negotiations.
At Camp David, says Dr. Hasasian, the Israelis were
vague. Once they spoke of annexing 5 percent of West
Bank territory, another time they spoke of 10 percent.
Sometimes the calculations were based on a smaller West
Bank area, minus Area H (no man's land) from 1948, East
Jerusalem and the Dead Sea. Sometimes the calculations
were based on the original area captured in 1967.
Therefore, he explains, the maps are based on estimates
and conclusions regarding the proposals made at Camp
David and are not consensus maps.
The question of Jerusalem is essential for understanding
the Palestinian objection to Barak's proposals, says
Husseini, not because of its great religious importance,
but because of its geographical location and its
importance for guaranteeing Palestinian geographic
continuity and viability. "Israel wants to
determine the permanent borders based on the settlements
- we say that the fate of the settlements will be
determined by the borders."
Husseini reiterates everything that has already been
said from every Palestinian platform and what he
believes is the message of the Intifada today: the
principle must be a return to the borders of June 4,
1967. The moment Israel accepts this principle, the
Palestinians will be ready to negotiate a flexible
implementation of it and of the fate of settlements -
evacuation, territorial swaps, granting Palestinian
citizenship to settlers who wish to remain. "But
already at the Madrid Conference, we understood that the
negotiations were on the basis of UN [Security Council]
Resolutions 242 and 338," says Husseini. "The
negotiations aren't over resolutions, but about how to
implement them."
According to him, there is no contradiction between
resuming negotiations and continuing the Intifada.
"After all, in the end, a solution will be achieved
only through negotiations. Israelis understand that they
can negotiate while they expand and build settlements. I
understand that I can negotiate while the Intifada
continues. Or else Israel should immediately stop all
building in the settlements."
The Jerusalem Task Force is in contact with the
negotiation department headed by Abu Mazen (Mahmoud
Abas), but the drafting of the maps was its own
independent initiative, says Husseini. Jerusalem is
under discussion and here, too, the key word is
settlements. Therefore, he is convinced his initiative
affects the entire process. According to the data that
the task force has, the Palestinian built-up area covers
no more than 5 percent of the West Bank (including East
Jerusalem). The built-up area of the settlements
(including East Jerusalem) covers about 1.8 percent of
the area of the West Bank. This figure reflects the
scale of Israeli construction since 1967 as well as the
restriction of Palestinian development.
According to the Palestinians, the Israeli proposal at
Camp David - which has been translated into the Orient
House maps - perpetuates this principle: Jewish
development, population expansion and establishing
Jerusalem as an Israeli metropolis, and on the other
hand, dividing and cutting off the Palestinian
settlements from each other, pushing Palestinian
Jerusalem to the margins, geographically, politically
and economically speaking, and halting the natural
process of transforming Bethlehem-Jerusalem-Ramallah
into a Palestinian metropolis.
Had the Palestinians been willing to accept the Israeli
solution for Jerusalem (which includes annexing the
Adumim bloc - 120 square kilometers around Ma'aleh
Adumim and the Etzion bloc - they would have in essence
been agreeing to splitting the Palestinian state into
two: north and south, with the passage between them
under Israeli control. The Israeli demand at Camp David
to also control two east-west routes (the Trans-Samaria
highway and the Tel Aviv-Amman road, currently under
construction) would mean that the Palestinian state
would be divided into three cantons, as the Palestinians
put it, and the links between them would always be at
the mercies of Israel, the Israel Defense Forces and the
settlers